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Theories on determinants of demand for owner occupied homes are summarised. An 
operational model which can be applied for empirical testing of theory is established. The 
model is estimated using Danish data.  
 
Theoretical determinants of the demand for owner occupied homes include social composition 
of population (age, social benefit receivers, household composition, civil status, education, 
nationality), economic ability (income), public regulation (regulation of house rent, housing 
subsidies, taxation), competition from alternative residence forms (measured by supply of 
subsidized housing), and population density.  
 
The data to be applied are aggregate data for 270 Danish municipalities, available annually for 
the period 1994-2004. 
 
An initial model specifies that the effects of the determinants are constant during the period 
1994-2004. Presence of non-linearity, time trends, parametric instability and spatial spill-over 
are investigated and accounted for. Upon these adjustment, the empirical results generally  
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confirm that the impacts of these determinants correspond to theory. Adjustment for spatial 




The purpose of the present study is to establish a model for demand of owner occupied homes 
in Denmark for the period 1994 to 2004. 
 
Theories on determinants of demand for owner occupied homes are summarised in Part 2. 
Theoretical determinants of the demand for owner occupied homes include social composition 
of population (age, social benefit receivers, household composition, civil status, education, 
nationality), economic ability (income), public regulation (regulation of house rent, housing 
subsidies, taxation), competition from alternative residence forms (measured by supply of 
subsidized housing), and population density.  
 
An operational model which can be applied for empirical testing of theory is established in 
Part 3. Relevant methodological issues are considered. Issues related to the application of 
pooled cross sectional data are discussed. This include parametric instability over time and 
adjustment for dependency caused by repeated observation. Further, issues related to 
functional form is considered, i.e. linear versus non-linear relationship among variables. 
Finally, issues related to application of  spatial cross sections are considered, i.e. potential 
presence of spatial spill-over. 
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Part 4 describes the data to be applied. These are aggregate data for 270 Danish 
municipalities, available annually for the period 1994-2004. 
 
The empirical models are presented in Part 5. An initial model specifies that the effects of the 
determinants are common during the period 1994-2004. Within this model, issues of non-
linear relations are resolved. Next, parametric instability over time, together with adjustment 
for dependency across time periods and spatial spill-over is addressed using an SUR model 
with time-specific parameters. It is found that the parametric instability over time can be 
ascribed to time patterns in the parameters so that a simplified specification with time 
interactions can be established. 
 
2. Demand for owner occupied homes. 
Demand for owner occupied homes is a fraction of total demand for homes or residential 
units, the other part being rented homes. The purpose of the present paper is not to estimate 
the absolute demand for owner occupied homes, but to find determinants for the fraction of 
owners based on Danish data. The question to be answered is thus which factors significantly 
influence the home ownership rate and so the choice between owning and renting.  
 
2.1. Theoretical considerations 
Basically, individuals or families choose to own the stock from which housing services flow if 
it is most optimal or welfare maximizing given their specific economic environment. Thus 
changes of the economic environment may lead to a shift of the optimal choice away from 
ownership or into ownership. It follows that a listing of the decisive factors in the economic  
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environment will also be a listing of factors that influence the demand for owner occupied 
homes. 
 
Linneman (1986), Rothenberg, Galster, Butler and Pitkin (1991), and Hansen and Skak 
(2004) put together give a comprehensive list of potential explanatory variables for home 
ownership rates.  
Typically, a favourable tax treatment of homeowners is mentioned first as a very important 
factor behind homeownership. One should, however, keep in mind that it is the differential tax 
treatment between housing units that are owned or rented, and between persons that live in 
owned or rented homes that matters. Concerning the taxation of housing units, a real estate tax 
in general disfavours housing investments compared to other investment opportunities but 
plays no role for the choice between renting and owning when it has to be paid both by the 
home owner and the landlord. In the same way, the possibility of deducting interest payments 
on loans that finance housing in taxable income does not favour ownership when the interest 
payments are deductible no matter who lives in the housing unit, an owner or a renter. 
Concerning the taxation of occupants, the most widespread favourable tax exemption that 
favours ownership is the low or non existent tax on the imputed and often underestimated 
value of the flow of housing services to owner-occupiers. This gives owner-occupiers a low 
net rent compared to non owners, and it is lower the higher is the marginal tax rate – or tax 
bracket - of the income earner. Also landlords may be treated preferentially; i. e. by 
favourable depreciation rates and/or direct subsidies, which on a competitive market will 
benefit the renter through lower rent. An owner of an estate can also expect to get a low taxed 
income through the increase of the market value of the estate that evolves from increased 
congestion. Typically, the supply of land (of a specific quality) is limited while demand  
  6 
increases due to population growth and this drives prices higher than justified by increasing 
construction costs. If landlords have to pay full taxation of such capital income while home 
owners have no or a reduce tax rate, this gives an advantage for home ownership, and more so 
the higher is the marginal tax rate of the income earner. Finally, is important to stress that 
landlord gains are only passed fully to renters with an inelastic demand under perfect 
competition. With a housing market cut into many sub markets, monopolistic competition and 
oligopoly better characterise the markets and hence, landlord gains are only partly transferred 
into lower rents. 
 
If, on the other hand, an income subsidy is triggered by renting vs. owning, home ownership 
rates are reduced. Moreover, if rent control artificially keeps the rent on rented homes below 
the market equilibrium this also reduces demand for owned housing. Finally, if, e.g. for social 
reasons, only a fraction of homes can be owned because a big supply of rented homes is 
wanted, this can potentially reduce home ownership rates, but only if the restriction limits the 
supply of owned homes compared to a free market. 
 
Another important factor is the borrowing capacity of individuals or households. To buy a 
home is very costly for most persons and is typically done with a combination of a down 
payment supplemented with a loan to be repaid over a number of years, and with the house or 
apartment used as collateral. If the person fails to service the debt, the borrower will try to sell 
the housing unit to recoup the loan. But it is costly to sell a house and the revenue is insecure, 
and hence the borrower will prefer to give loans to persons with good credit rating. Many 
people may well prefer to be owner-occupiers, but are unable to buy their homes because of 
low borrowing capacity. With credit rating or borrowing capacity increasing with the  
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(expected future) annual income level of persons, one can expect ownership rates to increase 
with household income. Other factors that may affect credit rating, and hence ownership rates, 
are ethnicity and race, educational level, and more generally personal characteristics and 
former events that a lender finds important for the credit rating. In countries where institutions 
require a considerable down payment, wealth will play a corresponding important role relative 
to (expected future) annual income. This seems to be the case on the American housing 
market, see Gyourko (2003).   
 
Owning a home is costly not only because of the debt servicing that typically follows after the 
buying, but also because salaries to real estate agents and lawyers, and document fees make 
the buying process expensive. Similar costs are low or non existent for a renter, which clearly 
shows that owning must carry compensating advantages compared to renting. Because the 
buying or closing costs are high for owners and the advantages from owning are part of the 
annual flow of housing services for owner-occupiers, it follows that the expected occupation 
time, and factors that influence the closing costs will also influence home ownership rates. In 
example, one would expect students to be primarily renters as they do not expect to stay put 
for many years. High closing costs furthermore gives a locking in effect that reduces 
geographical mobility as noted by Oswald (1997). 
 
Linneman (1986) also invokes differences in production efficiency between landlords and 
owner-occupiers as an important factor behind ownership rates. In example, landlords 
internalise externalities that cause problems among neighbours in multi family structures and 
may be able to use their buying power to reduce maintenance costs. But this higher efficiency 
of landlords in the supply of housing services may well be more than fully offset by costs  
  8 
from monitoring the renter and limitations on the renters use of the housing unit – and so the 
housing services that flow from unit. Linneman (1986) holds the opinion that high production 
efficiency by landlords in high density residences is the reason why ownership rates tend to 
fall when one travel from the countryside and into city centres. Hansen and Skak (2004) takes 
the unorthodox view that persons or households differs with respect to the benefit they gain 
from individual adaptation of housing units, i. e. by changing and painting rooms, to suit their 
preferences. Because of contracting problems, owner-occupiers have much more freedom in 
adaptation and this potentially offsets the closing costs of owner-occupancy. The model gives 
a sorting mechanism, where owners are persons with strong preference for individual 
adaptation of their home. With high rent levels in congested cities, this model also explains 
why ownership rates tend to fall from the countryside and into city centres. A disadvantage of 
the model is that it is difficult to identify or rang persons after their preference for individual 
home adaptation. However, Ærø (2002) shows an exceptional high renovation and repair 
activity among home owners. A priori, one would also expect self employed to be more 
individualistic oriented than wage earners and hence have higher ownership rates than wage 
earners. Also growing families (i.e. families with more than one child) can be expected to 
demand ownership, because of the need to change the interior of homes when children are 
born. This has yet to be empirically tested. 
 
Table 1 resumes the variables that, following economic theory, can be expected to influence 
ownership rates. In addition to economic factors behind demand for owner occupied homes, 
more sociological relations play a role. Two seem of special relevance. First, a social heritage 
is present; people tend to demand the type of dwelling they used to live in as child and this 
also counts for their tenure choice. The consequence for the housing market is that tenure  
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patterns may be very persistent and change only slowly over generations. Second, demand 
may come from the wish of the consumer to manifest himself as a member of a specific social 
group and lifestyle. Such behavioural patterns could give long lasting bubbles in tenure 
patterns as modes gather momentum, peaks and decays. The consequence for an econometric 
analysis of tenure pattern is that ownership rates to day are influenced by yesterday’s 
ownership rates. In a more permanent way, the proportion of singles that want to remain free 
and movable would tend to lower home ownership rates. 
  [Table 1 around here] 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence and background. 
During the 1980’es and 1990’es, the Danish housing supply improved substantially in quality 
as well as in quantity. For the first decade, this development was connected to an increase in 
the demographically related housing need, while the changes in this need was relatively low 
in the 1990’es as compared to the increase in supply. Thus, the major determinants during the 
1990’es are related to changes in request to housing. Three major trends are well identified 
(Byforum, 2001): First, an increasing number of persons over 18 live together with parents. 
Second, fewer young families live in owner occupied homes. Third, some of the weak groups 
have received poorer housing conditions. Apart from retired people, who improved their 
housing conditions, unemployed, social benefit receivers and immigrants have substantially 
worsened housing conditions than the population on average. 
 
As compared to other European countries, Denmark has a strong regulation of conditions and 
prices for private rental homes, and further a price regulation of subsidized housing which is 
determined by costs and not by market prices or quality concerns. For certain areas, this has  
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led to a mismatch between supply and demand, an excess demand for rental housing, and a 




Based on aggregate data from a sample of 270 Danish municipalities observed annually from 
1994 to 2004, a regression model is to be estimated to investigate the effects of determinants 
on the demand for owner-occupied homes. Due to the nature of the data, some 
methodological developments are called for. First, as data occur from repeated observation in 
consequent time periods, adjustment for heterogeneity is necessary, as the residual variance of 
the regression model may change. Further, adjustment for inter-temporal correlation among 
observations is necessary. These adjustments are captured using a spatial SUR framework as 
outlined in Section 3.1. Second, due to the spatial cross-section nature of data, further 
adjustment of the SUR model for spatial spill-over effects are necessitated in order to obtain 
consistent and efficient estimates. These adjustments are outlined in Section 3.2. 
3.1. The SUR model. 
Assuming only one cross-section - i.e. data for only one period – a simple linear model reads 
as 
(1)  yt = Xtβt + µt ,  µt ~N(0,σ
2
tI) 
where Xt is an n by k matrix of explanatory variables, y an n dimensional vector and βt a k 
dimensional coefficient vector. The regression vector βt is traditionally estimated by means of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), while µt is assumed to have a homoscedastic and diagonal 
variance matrix.  
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Applying data for T periods leads to T equations, one for each time period, where the T 
equations will in general be intercorrelated, and the variance for the single cross section will 
vary over time. The covariance matrix for the full system will thus be heteroscedastic and 
non-diagonal. The variance- and covariance matrix between any two periods reads as 
(2) E(µs µt’) = σ
2
tsIn , t,s = 1, .. , T 
The covariance matrix Σ0 for the entire system of nT observations is the nT by nT matrix 
(3)  Σ0 = {σ
2
tsIn}t,s=1,..,T   =  Σ⊗ In 
where Σ is the T by T matrix 
(4)  Σ = {σ
2
ts }t,s=1,..,T 
For ease of notation, the equations may be stacked as follows: Let y be the nT dimensional 
vector constructed by concatenating y1,..,yT ,where yt is the dependent variable for period t. 
Define µ and β in the same way, and define the NT by KT matrix X = diag(X1, .. , XT). The 
model can now be written in compact form as 
(5)  y = Xβ + µ ,  µ ~N(0,Σ0) 
The model (5) can be estimated consistently, but not efficiently, by means of OLS. The 
inefficiency is due to the heteroscedasticity and the nondiagonality of  Σ0, and causes inflation 
of the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters, which further inflate any inference 
based on these OLS results. As an alternative, GLS estimation is used to define the Zellner 
(1962) SUR estimate for β, denoted βSUR, and a feasible GLS procedure applied to obtain a 
consistent estimate of the covariance matrix (see Appendix A.1 for details on estimation). 
 
Inter-equation correlation and heteroscedasticity of the error term does not necessarily 
preclude β from being constant over time. This opportunity is tested using the Wald test 
described in Appendix A.1.   
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If β is found to be constant over time, it is reasonable to redefine X as the concatenating of 
X1, .. , XT, replace β with a T vector, and estimate the model on the form (5) using these. As 
an alternative, time-varying parameters may be specified to be a function of time, which is 
obtained by incorporating interaction variables with T for these variables. 
 
3.2. SUR models with spatial effects. 
The concept of spatial effects is quite intuitive: Assume that the demand for owner occupied 
homes is high in the municipalities surrounding a specific municipality in question. Then, the 
prices of owner-occupied homes will rise in these surrounding municipalities, so that their 
residents will demand owner-occupied homes in the municipality in question. Put another way 
– the demand for owner occupied homes in one municipality spills over to surrounding 
municipalities. Apart from such ‘endogenous’ spill-over, ‘exogenous’ spill-over may occur 
from the explanatory characteristics. For example, rising incomes in a specific municipality 
may lead to increased demand, not only in the municipality in question, but also in 
municipalities surrounding it. To make these concepts operational, specify an n by n matrix 
W where wij equals 1 if municipality i and j are neighbours (i≠j) and 0 otherwise, and divide 
each element in W with the number of non-zero elements in the row it belongs to. Then, the 
product Wyt define a variable, which for each municipality holds the average of  y in the 
neighbouring municipalities, and the endogenous spill-over captured by a spatially 
autoregressive (SAR) specification on the form (Anselin, 1988) 
(6)  yt = λtWyt + µt,  
where λt is a parameter specifying the degree of spill-over, formally restricted to the interval 
between (-1) and (+1), but for most practical purposes restricted to be zero or positive (a  
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negative parameter would indicate negative spill-over, i.e. increasing demand leads to ‘drain’ 
of demand in neighbouring municipalities). Enlarging the SAR with explanatory variables 
leads to the SAR-X specification 
(7)  yt = λtWyt + Xtβt + µt, 
which may finally be enlarged with terms allowing for exogenous spill-over, so that the SAR-
X-DL specification (Florax, 1992) 
(8)  yt = λtWyt + Xtβt + (WXt)δt + µt 
occurs. An interesting special case occurs, if the endogenous and exogenous spill-over are of 
proportional magnitude, i.e. if the restriction δt = λtβt (the spatial Durbin restriction) holds 
true. Then, (8) may be rearranged as 
(9) (I- λtW)yt = (I-λtW)Xtβt + µt 
or 
(10)  yt = Xtβt + (I-λtW)
-1µt = Xtβt + εt, 
where  εt = (I-λtW)
-1µt represents a spatially autocorrelated error term, which may be 
equivalently expressed as εt = λtWεt + µt. The specification (10) – denoted the SAC model – 
differs conceptually from the SAR-X-DL by specifying the spatial spill-over to be of a 
residual, rather than a substantial, nature. 
 
These one-period models are easily extended to T periods SUR models along the lines in the 
previous section, using the established notation. Thus, a SAR-XSUR specification reads as 
(11)  y = (Λ⊗W)y + Xβ  + µ, 
while a SAR-X-DLSUR is defined by 
(12)  y = (Λ⊗W)y + Xβ + ((Λ⊗W)X)δ + µ, 
and a SACSUR as  
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(13)  y = Xβ + (I- Λ⊗W)
-1µ = Xβ + ε, 
with Λ = diag(λ1, .., λT), ε = (Λ⊗W)ε + µ, and µ defined according to (2)-(5). 
 
Estimation of the spatially adjusted SUR models is performed using Instrument Variables 
(IV) estimation as outlined in the Appendix. Further, adequacy of the models is addressed 
using a variety of tests: 
-  Initially, the SUR model is tested for presence of spatial autocorrelation using a 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) pre-test. This test is known to have good power against 
other specifications of spatial effects, including the SAR, and thus serves as a general 
proxy of potential spatial spill-over of any form (see Appendix A.2). 
-  The SAR-XDLSUR is tested for the Durbin restriction using a Wald type Delta post-test 
applied to each year separately (See Appendix A.3). 
-  The SAR-XDLSUR is tested for relevance of the additional DL term, using a Wald 
post-test (see Appendix A.3). 
-  All spatially adjusted models are tested for relevance of the spatial parametres (i.e. the 




The data to be applied are aggregate cross section data observed for 270 Danish 
municipalities (5 municipalities on the island of Bornholm were omitted due to data 
problems) annually from 1994 to 2004. These were collected from three sources: The 
Statistical Bank at Statistics Denmark, the Key Figure Base [Nøgletalsbasen] at the Ministry 
of the Interior, and the Ministry of Urban and Housing Affairs’ (2000) report on regulation of  
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housing rents. Table 2 presents an overview of the data applied, including variable short-hand, 
definition and a few descriptive statistics. 
  [Table 2 around here] 
 
5. Results. 
Table 3 shows the results for the pooled OLS model and the adjusted SUR model. High 
proportions of widowed, divorced and unmarried reduce the proportion living in owner-
occupied homes (OOH) as expected. A high proportion of households with children over 18 
raises OOH as expected. Proportion of households without children under 18 is not 
significantly related to proportion living in OOH. Regulations, as measured by proportion 
living in subsidized housing, housing subsidies and regulation, is, as expected, negatively 
related to proportion living in OOH. Population density is negatively related to proportion 
living in OOH. A few effects are not as expected: Proportion with higher education is 
negatively related, property tax is positively related, unemployment is positively related, and 
income is negatively related to proportion living in OOH.  
  [Table 3 around here] 
An explanation for these unexpected signed effects may be non-linear relations. We thus tried 
adding squares of these variables, defined by UNEMP2=UNEMP*UNEMP etc. The resulting 
OLS and SUR models are further reported in Table 3. Curvature relationships seems to be 
present for the variables mentioned. For property tax and unemployment U-shaped relations 
are found, with peaks well beyond the 75 percent quartiles for property tax and 
unemployment, thus indicating that the suggested negative relationship holds for most of the 
municipalities. For income, an alike U-shape is found with a peak well below the 25 percent 
quartile of income, thus indicating that the expected positive relationship is present for most  
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of the municipalities. Finally, an inverted U-shape is found for education, with a top well 
beyond the 75 percent quartile of income, thus supporting the expected positive relation for 
the majority of the observations. 
 
Table 4 reports the SUR model, estimated with time-specific coefficients. Beginning with the 
Wald tests for parametric stability, the impact of the regulation variables (susidized housing, 
subsidies for housing expenditure, subsidies for rent expenditure, and regulation) and 
inhabitants from third countries are seen to be unstable over time. Turning next to the 
estimated coefficients for these variables, distinct patterns are seen to be present. For 
inhabitants from third countries, there seems to be a shift as the coefficients drop from close 
to 0 down to significantly negative from 1999 and onwards. For rent subsidies, an alike drop 
seems to occur from 2000 and onwards. For subsidized housing, the coefficients seem to 
move slightly upwards from significantly negative toward 0 during the period from 1994 to 
2004. For housing expenditure subsidy and regulation, there seems to be an increase from 
negative and up towards 0 during the period. It is thus suggested to add interaction variables 
to the model. These are defined as interactions with time (defined as a time trend variable 
multiplied to the variable in question) for subsidised housing, expenditure subsidy and 
regulation, while an interaction with levels variables (defined as a dummy variable for the 
years in question, multiplied to the variable) are suggested for inhabitants from third countries 
and rent subsidy. 
  [Table 4 around here] 
A SUR model with common coefficients for time periods but with the suggested time 
interacted variables is thus estimated and reported in Table 5. It is seen that the impact of 
inhabitants from third countries on owner-occupied housing is negative, and that this impact  
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is further strengthened from 1999 and onwards. For subsidized housing, the impact is negative 
and gradually strengthened throughout the period from 1994 to 2004. The impact of 
expenditure subsidies is around 0 in the beginning of the period but gradually moves toward 
significantly negative throughout the period. Rent subsidies has a negative impact as 
expected, and this effect is further strengthened in the period from 2000 and onwards. Finally, 
regulation has the expected negative impact, but this impact is reduced towards 0 through the 
period. 
  [Table 5 around here] 
Adjustment for substantial spatial spill-over in the demand for OOH is initially performed 
using the SAR-XSUR specification. The presence of spatial spill-over is evident from the 
positive λ coefficients, which are significant for the first part of the period from 1994 to 1998. 
The inconsistency of the SUR without spatial adjustment is further evident, as some 
determinants, which were found to be significant in the unadjusted SUR, are insignificant in 
the SAR-X adjusted specification. These are especially some demographic variables, i.e. age 
composition, inhabitants from third countries, and taxation. When further adjusting for 
exogenous spill-over applying the SAR-X-DL adjusted specification, some further variables 
looses significance, including households with children over 18 years, population density and 
tax base, while some other variables gain significance, including percentage of early retired 
and percentage of population in subsidized housing. The exogenous spill-over is especially 
predominant for percentage of divorced, early retired, subsidized housing and tax rate. A 
distinctive feature is observed, as the spatial lag of some determinants have opposite effects of 
the determinant itself. This implies that the full effect of the determinant is only obtained, if 
the municipality is distinctive as compared to the region surrounding it. Consider, as an 
example, subsidized housing: If a municipality has a high percentage of population receiving  
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subsidies, then the percentage living in OOH is low. But if the percentages of population 
receiving subsidies are equally high for the surrounding municipalities, then the former 
negative effect is outperformed. Thus, subsidies does not affect the demand for OOH if the 
subsidising scheme is equal for an entire region of municipalities. Alike features are observed 
– with more or less significance – for the other regulation related variables. Thus, regulation 
fully affects the demand for OOH if it is implemented locally in one municipality, but only 
partly or not at all if it is implemented equally for a larger region of municipalities. An alike 
conclusion is obtained for most of the socio-demographic and economic determinants. With a 
few exceptions, it may thus be concluded that if a set of conditions change equally for a 
region of municipalities, then the demand for OOH is considerably less affected than if the 
conditions change only for one municipality. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
An economic model describing determination of demand for owner-occupied homes (OOH) is 
established and partly confirmed by empirical evidence. It is found that regulation reduces the 
demand. Further, a favourable personal tax treatment increases the demand, while high 
property taxes reduces it. The impact of borrowing capacity (as measured by income and 
education) is positive as expected. While age composition of population is mainly found to be 
insignificant, a positive effect is found from having adult children living at home. Further, 
singleness (measured as widowed, unmarried and divorced) significantly reduce the demand 
for OOH. Finally, presence of spatial spill-over is predominant. Specifically, a positive 
endogenous spill-over is present, implying that high demand in the surrounding municipalities 
induces demand in the present municipality. Opposed to this positive endogenous spill-over, 
the exogenous spill-over is of a contra-signed nature, as the sign of the exogenous spill-over is  
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opposite to that of the exogenous effect itself. Especially, the spill-over effect of regulation is 
of such a nature, so that a full effect of regulation on demand for OOH is only obtained if the 
municipality deviates from the local surrounding municipalities. 
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A.1. Estimation and inference of the SUR model. 
GLS estimation is used to define the Zellner (1962) SUR estimate for β, defined by 








which can both be feasibly estimated conditioned on a consistent estimate of  Σ. The latter can be 





ts = ut’us / n   ,   t,s = 1, .. , T 
where ut is the residual obtained from OLS estimation of (1). Thus, consistent estimates S for Σ and 
S0 for Σ0 are obtained, and feasible SUR estimates for (7) and (8), denoted bF-SUR and VF-SUR, 
obtained. 
 
To test the k'th parameter in βt, k=1,..,K, for constancy over time, the composite hypothesis  
(A.4) H0k: βk1 - βkt = 0, t = 2,..,T  
is respecified as  
(A.5) H0k: Rkβ = 0 
by defining Rk as the (T-1) by (TK) matrix, where the i’th row is defined by letting the element in 
column  k  be 1, the element in column (iK+k) be (-1) and the remainding elements be 0. The 
hypothesis can be tested using the Wald test 
(A.6)  Wk = (RkbF-SUR)’(Rk(X’S0X)
-1Rk’)
-1 (RkbF-SUR) 
which follows a χ
2 distribution with (T-1) degrees of freedom under H0k. The test is 
straightforwardly applied to the entire set of explanatory variables, by stacking the Rk ‘s into one  
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matrix, R, and replace Rk with R in (A.6). The resulting Wald test then has K(T-1) degrees of 
freedom. 
 
If β is constant over time, it is reasonable to redefine X as the concatenating of X1, .. , XT, replace β 
with a T vector, and estimate the model using these. 
 
A. 2. Estimation and inference in the SACSUR. 
It is well known that presence of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of a regression model leads 
to inefficient OLS estimates, so that maximum likelihood (ML) estimation is necessitated (Anselin, 
1988). For the SACSUR model, an ML estimation procedure were outlined by Anselin (1988), 
leading a test for spatial spill-over. Even though the estimation itself is not applied here, but only 
the derived pre-test, a brief outline is adequate. 
 
Defining B = (I-(Λ⊗W))
-1, the covariance matrix for µ becomes (Σ⊗I), so that the covariance 
matrix for ε is Ω=B(Σ⊗I)B'. The above SACSUR model is thus written as 
(A.2.1)  y = Xβ + ε , ε ~N(0,Ω) 
The parameters to be estimated are β, Σ and Λ. The maximum likelihood function for y becomes 
(Anselin, 1988) 
(A.2.2) L  =  (-1/2)ln(|Ω|) – (1/2)( y – Xβ)’ Ω
-1( y – Xβ), 
which, using the block-diagonality of Ω, becomes (Anselin, 1988) 
(A.2.3) L  =  (-n/2)ln(|Σ|) + Σt=1..T ln(|I- λtW|) – (1/2)( y – Xβ)’ Ω
-1( y – Xβ). 
The first order condition for maximizing the likelihood function with respect to β gives (Anselin, 
1988) 




while for Σ the ML estimate becomes (Anselin, 1988) 
(A.2.5)  Σ = Z’Z / n 
where Z is an n by T matrix Z = [z1, .. , zT] obtained with zt = (I-λtW)et , t = 1, .. , T. The ML 
estimate for Λ is provided by the non-linear equation system (Anselin, 1988) 
(A.2.6) tr(W(I-λtW)
-1) = Σs=1,..,T σ
ts(etW’(I-λsW)es)   ,   t = 1 , .. , T. 
where σ
ts is the(t,s)'th element in Σ
-1. 
 
Consistent pseudo maximum likelihood estimates for β,  Σ and Λ may be obtained using the 
following calculations (Anselin, 1988): 
 
1. Let Λ=0. Determine the OLS-estimate for β, b=(X'X)
1X'y. Let e be the estimated OLS-residuals. 
2. Determine the estimate for Σ using (15). 
3. Determine the ML estimate for β using (14). Update e=y-Xβ. 
4. Determine Λ by solving (16), update Σ using (15), β using (14), and e=y-Xβ. 
 
While consistent pseudo maximum likelihood estimates (which satisfies for most practical 
purposes) are obtained using these calculations, efficient maximum likelihood estimates may be 
obtained by iterating step 4. until convergence (Anselin, 1988). The significance of the estimated 
parameters – as well as any hypothesis involving these - are tested using Wald tests based on the 
second order conditions of the likelihood function (see Anselin, 1988). 
 
Clearly, it is computationally involved to estimate the SACSUR model. Therefore, it is convenient to 
perform a pre-test for absence of spatial spill-over, which does not involve the estimation of Λ. 
Anselin (1988) derived the following LM test for H0 : Λ = 0, which requires the estimation of a  
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feasible SUR model only. The test is asymptotically distributed as χ
2 with T degrees of freedom and 
reads as 





where T1 = tr(W’W), T2 = tr(W
2), i is a vector of ones, U is an n by T matrix with the et’s from the 
feasible SUR as columns, and # denotes the Hadamard product. For an investigation of the finite-
sample performance of the LM test, see Lauridsen (2005a). 
 
A. 3. Estimation and inference in the SAR-XSUR and SAR-X-DLSUR. 
The SAR-XSUR were suggested by Anselin (1988), who provided the log likelihood function 
(A.3.1) L  =  (-n/2)ln(|Σ|) + ln(|A|)– (1/2)ν’ν, 
where A = I-(Λ⊗W) and ν’ν = (Ay-Xβ)’(Σ
-1⊗I)(Ay-Xβ). Using the block-diagonal structure of A 
and the notation At = I- λtW, this simplifies to (Anselin, 1988) 
(A.3.2) L  =  (-n/2)ln(|Σ|) + Σt=1..T ln(|At|) – (1/2)ν’ν. 
Further, Anselin (1988) outlined a consistent Instrument Variable estimation routines for the 
estimation of Λ and β. Specifically, the IV estimator for b = (λ’,β’) is obtained conditioned on Σ as 
(Anselin, 1988) 




with asymptotic covariance matrix 
(A.3.4)  bIV = {Z’Q[Q’(Σ⊗I)Q]
-1Q’Z}
-1 
where Z = [Wy1(0) , .. , WyT(0)  X ], using the notation Wyt(0) to denote an nT vector, where the 
elements for period t are Wyt, and the remaining elements 0. The matrix Q holds the instruments 
for Z. Naturally, X serves as an instrument for itself. For each of the Wyt, the suggestion of Anselin 
(1988) to apply the spatial lag of the predicted values from a regression of  yt on Xt is adopted (see 
Anselin, 1988, for discussion of alternative choices of instruments).  
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An iterative estimation of bIV consists of the steps: 
1. Estimate an equation for each time period separately (by replacing Σ with s
2I). Obtain residuals 
et. Obtain estimates of elements s
2
ts of Σ as s
2
ts = et’es/n. 
2. Obtain the estimate bIV for b conditioned on Σ. Obtain residual e = y – ZbIV. Update Σ. 
3. Repeat step 2. until convergence. 
 
The SAR-X-DLSUR is estimated completely along the lines as for the SAR-XSUR specification by 
simply enlargening X to consist of X as well as the spatial lag of these variables, excluding the 
constant term. Specifically, writing X as [i X0], where i is a column of ones, and X0 denotes the 
variables in X apart from the constant term, the variables to enter the SAR-X specification are X = 
[i X0], while those entering the SAR-X-DL specification are X = [i X0 WX0 ]. 
 
It is of relevance to examinate constancy over time of the λt ‘s. This is easily performed in the SAR-
XSUR as well as the SAR-XDLSUR, using a Wald post-test defined along the lines as for the 
constancy over time of the coefficients in the SUR model, see Appendix A.1.  
 
Further, it is relevant to test the non-linear Durbin restrictions on the SAR-XSUR in order to 
determine whether this model is necessary or whether the simpler SARSUR satisfies. Wald-type 
Delta post-tests are obtained by specifying the Durbin restriction as 
(A.3.5) H0 : ft (θt) = (δt - λtβt) = 0 
with θt = (βt´,δt´,λt)´, and using a first-order Taylor approximation of the covariance matrix of f(θt) 
provided by 
(A.3.6)  Vft = (d ft (θt)/dθt)’Vθt (dft(θt)/dθt)  
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where Vθt is the covariance matrix of θt, a Wald type Delta test is obtained for the Durbin restriction 
in period t as 
(A.3.7)  W = (ft(θt))´ Vft
-1 (ft(θt)) 
which follows a χ
2 distribution with K degrees of freedom. 
 
The IV estimation procedure as well as the tests are asymptotically justified. For an investigation of 
their finite-sample properties, see Lauridsen (2005b).  
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Table 1: Variables affecting home ownership rates 
 
Variable Explanation 
Favourable tax treatment of 
homeowners 
tax bracket (+) 
A favourable tax treatment triggered by ownership tends to raise 
ownership rates; such treatment, e.g. a low imputed rent, is 
typically more valuable for higher income tax brackets. 
Rent subsidy (-) 
Rent control (-) 
Urban restriction on 
ownership (-) 
Homeownership rates are reduces if an income subsidy is 
triggered by renting vs. owning. If rent control artificially keeps 
the rent on rented homes below the market equilibrium this also 
reduces demand for owned housing. If, e.g. for social reasons, 
only a fraction of homes can be owned, this potentially reduce 





educational level (+) 
other personal characteristics 
special life events (e.g. 
bequest, lottery) 
With asymmetric information on financial markets, various 
indicators of borrowers (homeowners) repayment ability will 
influence home ownership rates. 
Expected occupation time 
age (-) 
rate of “under education” (-) 
job type 
Ownership starts with closing or contracting costs that have to be 
balanced against benefits in each occupation year. If the expected 
number of occupation years is low, ownership rates tend to fall. 
Expected occupation years may also fall with some job types. 
Production efficiency for 
landlords vs. owner-occupiers 
Congestion (-) 
Where many live together landlord scale economies for 
production of housing services may be pronounced. 
Households differs in benefit 
from adapting their home 
self employed (+) 
more than one child (+) 
high rent area (-) 
Idiosyncratic variations in the benefit households or individuals 
get from individual adaptation of homes leads to a market 
screening where owners benefit most. High rents reduce net 
benefit for owners and squeeze some owners into renters. 
Social heritage 
parents tenure choice 
People tend to demand the type of dwelling they used to live in as 
child. 
Lifestyle 
rate of single households (-) 
lagged ownership rates (+) 
Modes of living, e.g. free single life vs. tied family life influence 
ownership rates. 
Note: A (+) indicates a positive correlation between the variable and the home ownership rate. 
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Table 2. Data applied 
 
Variable short-hand  Definition      25% quartile    Median  75% quartile 
PSHOOH  % of population living in owner-occupied homes  63.00    72.00  78.00 
PSH716  % of population aged 7-16      11.80    12.80  13.70 
PSH1725  % of population aged 17-25      8.43    9.68  10.78 
PSH2635  % of population aged 26-35      12.05    13.19  14.19 
PSH3666  % of population aged 36-66      39.84    41.63  43.69 
PSH67+  % of population aged 67 and over    12.00    13.50  15.10 
PSHWIDOW  % of population widowed      5.95    6.68  7.45 
PSHDIV  % of population divorced      4.72    5.67  7.25 
PSHUNMARR % of population unmarried      42.05    43.57  44.88 
PHCHO18  % of households with children over 18    7.93    9.13  10.36 
PHWCHU18  % of households without children under 18    0.00    3.18  5.78 
PSHEDU  % of population with further education    11.20    13.20  16.00 
PSHEARLYR  % of population on early retirement benefit [førtidspension]  6.30    7.50  8.90 
PSHSOCBEN  % of population receiving social benefits [kontanthjælp]  6.90    8.30  9.80 
PSHUNEMP  % of population (17-66 year) unemployed    3.90    5.00  6.60 
PSH3C  Number of citizens from countries outside    
EU, Scandinavia and North America per 10,000 inh.  8.10    14.30  21.90 
PSHSUBHOU  % of population living in subsidized housing    5.00    9.00  17.00 
PSHHSUB  % of households receiving housing subsidies [boligydelse]  8.80    10.80  13.30 
PSHRSUB  % of 15-66 year old receiving rent subsidies [boligsikring]  4.00    6.00  8.70 
POPDEN  Inhabitants per square kilometre     48    69  145 
PROPTAX  Real Property Tax (in 0/00) [Grundskyldspromille]  7.50    10.00  15.00 
TAXRATE  Municipal + county tax rate (in %) [Udskrivningsprocent]  19.80    20.50  21.20 
TAXBASE  Taxbase [beskatningsgrundlag] per inhabitant (100.000 DKK)  9.08    11.74  13.31 
REGUL  Housing Regulation Act  
[Boligreguleringsloven] asssumed by 2000 (1=yes, 0=no)  -    -  - 
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Table 3. Initial OLS and SUR models with common parameters.       
                Only linear terms:                    Nonlinear terms added: 
 
Variable         OLS:               SUR:               OLS:               SUR: 
 
Intercept       164.354***(12.34)  142.587***(9.830)  152.661***(12.35)  144.129***(9.867) 
PSH716           -0.111   (0.170)    0.106   (0.101)   -0.030   (0.167)    0.117   (0.103) 
PSH1725          -0.997***(0.131)   -0.347   (0.104)   -1.030***(0.129)   -0.391   (0.105) 
PSH2635           0.261   (0.185)   -0.049   (0.123)    0.402** (0.183)    0.004   (0.125) 
PSH3666          -0.559***(0.127)   -0.275   (0.112)   -0.228*  (0.135)   -0.186   (0.114) 
PSH67+           -0.440***(0.143)   -0.729***(0.117)   -0.251*  (0.142)   -0.665***(0.118) 
PSHWIDOW         -1.454***(0.156)   -0.469***(0.147)   -1.419***(0.152)   -0.520***(0.148) 
PSHDIV           -0.796***(0.103)   -1.015***(0.108)   -0.746***(0.101)   -1.012***(0.109) 
PSHUNMARR        -0.864***(0.070)   -0.717***(0.072)   -0.696***(0.071)   -0.677***(0.073) 
PHCHO18           0.837***(0.074)    0.381***(0.049)    0.881***(0.074)    0.381***(0.049) 
PHWCHU18         -1.847   (1.198)    0.012   (0.491)   -2.250*  (1.168)   -0.077   (0.508) 
PSHEDU            0.055***(0.019)   -0.049   (0.033)    0.381***(0.064)    0.017   (0.108) 
PSHEARLYR         0.008   (0.057)   -0.005   (0.070)   -0.145** (0.059)   -0.033   (0.070) 
PSHSOCBEN         0.194***(0.048)    0.013   (0.033)    0.201***(0.048)    0.009   (0.033) 
PSHUNEMP          0.249***(0.039)    0.109***(0.028)   -0.439***(0.132)   -0.260***(0.072) 
PSH3C            -0.031***(0.006)   -0.027***(0.006)   -0.026***(0.007)   -0.027***(0.006) 
PSHSUBHOU        -0.45*** (0.012)   -0.535***(0.018)   -0.446***(0.011)   -0.524***(0.017) 
PSHHSUB          -0.354***(0.040)   -0.154***(0.038)   -0.331***(0.039)   -0.154***(0.037) 
PSHRSUB          -0.873***(0.064)   -0.558***(0.056)   -0.793***(0.065)   -0.547***(0.057) 
POPDEN           -6.355***(1.332)   -4.759***(2.303)   -6.517***(1.336)   -5.195***(2.376) 
PROPTAX           0.088***(0.014)    0.019   (0.016)   -0.107** (0.053)   -0.129***(0.056) 
TAXRATE           0.046   (0.062)    0.034   (0.059)   -0.002   (0.062)    0.039   (0.060) 
TAXBASE          -0.491***(0.059)   -0.252***(0.053)   -2.453***(0.201)   -1.220***(0.164) 
REGUL            -0.306** (0.148)   -0.800***(0.329)   -0.225   (0.147)   -0.735***(0.331) 
PSHEDU^2                                               -0.009***(0.002)   -0.002   (0.003) 
PROPTAX^2                                               0.007***(0.002)    0.005***(0.002) 
UNEMP^2                                                 0.034***(0.008)    0.021***(0.004) 
TAXBASE^2                                               0.066***(0.006)    0.033***(0.005) 
 
R-square(OLS)     0.926                                 0.929 
LogL             -4873.96           -1987.34           -4795.70           -2001.81 
AIC               9797.92            4154.68            9649.40            4191.62 
LM for SAC in SUR                    594.51***                             580.19*** 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%). 
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Table 4. SUR model with time-specific coefficients 
 
Year            1994      1995      1996      1997      1998      1999      2000      2001      2002      2003      2004      Wald (df=10) 
 
Constant       131.35*** 143.76*** 121.37*** 133.81*** 135.04*** 132.40*** 126.87*** 136.72*** 137.86*** 140.18*** 140.29***     3.21 
PSH716          -0.08     -0.07      0.25      0.07      0.02      0.01      0.16     -0.03      0.05     -0.17     -0.35        7.41 
PSH1725         -0.73***  -0.77***  -0.6 ***  -0.61***  -0.77***  -0.60***  -0.41***  -0.44***  -0.42***  -0.40**   -0.52***     5.67 
PSH2635         -0.46     -0.61***  -0.24     -0.59***  -0.45**   -0.18     -0.10     -0.23     -0.20     -0.23     -0.24        6.78 
PSH3666         -0.13     -0.37*    -0.02     -0.11     -0.09     -0.16     -0.17     -0.22     -0.24     -0.21     -0.22        6.06 
PSH67O          -0.51**   -0.65***  -0.47***  -0.62***  -0.54***  -0.70***  -0.70***  -0.84***  -0.95***  -1.08***  -1.12***     8.18 
PSHWIDOW        -0.26     -0.15     -0.14     -0.20     -0.27     -0.85***  -0.79***  -0.85***  -0.65***  -0.71***  -0.60***     9.75 
PSHDIV          -1.02***  -0.70***  -0.93***  -0.93***  -0.75***  -0.64***  -0.65***  -0.50***  -0.54***  -0.37***  -0.41***    17.52* 
PSHUNMARR       -0.29***  -0.47***  -0.42***  -0.40***  -0.35***  -0.40***  -0.50***  -0.51***  -0.62***  -0.57***  -0.55***     7.64 
PHCHO18          0.36***   0.43***   0.25***   0.13      0.20**    0.41***   0.39***   0.37***   0.28***   0.38***   0.47***    15.05 
PHWCHU18         0.50      0.02     -1.26     -0.30      1.28      1.50      0.45     -0.13     -1.35     -0.04     -1.03        6.60 
PSHEDU           0.04      0.04      0.17      0.11      0.16     -0.02      0.01      0.10      0.10      0.02      0.07        8.08 
PSHEARLYR        0.07      0.06     -0.07     -0.10     -0.11     -0.26***  -0.29***  -0.22***  -0.20**   -0.34***  -0.28***    14.78 
PSHSOCBEN        0.07      0.07      0.03      0.02      0.00      0.01     -0.01     -0.03     -0.04      0.04      0.05        3.86 
UNEMP           -0.54*    -0.36*    -0.29     -0.40     -0.40     -0.03      0.11      0.32      0.63     -0.01      0.03        7.92 
PSH3C           -0.01     -0.02**    0.00      0.00      0.00     -0.03***  -0.02**   -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.06***  -0.05***    24.81*** 
PSHSUBHOU       -0.58***  -0.59***  -0.56***  -0.55***  -0.55***  -0.53***  -0.51***  -0.50***  -0.49***  -0.46***  -0.44***    28.57*** 
PSHHSUB         -0.51***  -0.50***  -0.40***  -0.39***  -0.45***  -0.10*    -0.03     -0.12**   -0.14***  -0.01     -0.09       64.78*** 
PSHRSUB         -0.21***  -0.20***  -0.30***  -0.44***  -0.39***  -0.51***  -0.72***  -0.67***  -0.63***  -0.81***  -0.79***    32.99*** 
POPDEN          -4.79*    -5.40**   -6.27***  -5.14*    -6.49***  -5.29*    -6.86***  -6.58***  -7.18*** -10.35***  -9.72***     7.86 
PROPTAX          0.07      0.12     -0.02     -0.05     -0.10     -0.12     -0.19**   -0.17*    -0.17*    -0.25***  -0.21**     15.24 
TAXRATE          0.09      0.14     -0.03      0.06      0.10      0.04      0.06      0.17      0.22**    0.27**    0.28***    11.65 
TAXBASE          0.02      0.68      0.11      0.24     -0.52     -0.39      0.17     -0.44     -0.17     -0.21     -0.12       10.99 
REGUL           -1.21***  -1.53***  -1.40***  -1.25***  -1.49***  -0.60     -0.37     -0.34     -0.34     -0.31     -0.22       22.09*** 
PSHEDU^2        -0.01     -0.01     -0.01*    -0.01*    -0.01**    0.00      0.00     -0.01*    -0.01      0.00      0.00        9.53 
PROPTAX^2        0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00**    0.00      0.01**    0.01*     0.01*     0.01***   0.01**     14.84 
UNEMP^2          0.03**    0.02*     0.02      0.03*     0.04     -0.02     -0.02     -0.04     -0.08**   -0.01     -0.02        9.66 
TAXBASE^2       -0.02     -0.04     -0.01     -0.02      0.01      0.01     -0.01      0.02      0.01      0.01      0.01       10.93 
 
Wald (overall;df=280)                                                                                                         2590.68*** 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Significanse indicated by *** (1%), **(5%), *(10%)  
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Table 5. SUR and spatial SUR models adjusted for time trends       
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
              SUR                  SAR-X-SUR                   SAR-XDL-SUR 
                                                         X                    WX 
Constant     148.159***(9.993)     48.891   (87.29)     64.047   (171.14)     
PSH716        -0.001   (0.107)      0.844   (0.881)      0.208   (0.848)     -0.494   (1.573) 
PSH1725       -0.565***(0.105)     -0.278   (0.890)     -0.495   (0.857)     -0.016   (1.553) 
PSH2635       -0.196   (0.125)      1.151   (0.885)      0.095   (0.864)     -0.219   (1.612) 
PSH3666       -0.241** (0.114)      0.792   (0.879)      0.370   (0.843)     -0.703   (1.587) 
PSH67O        -0.770***(0.118)      0.669   (0.881)     -0.115   (0.851)      0.510   (1.594) 
PSHWIDOW      -0.545***(0.148)     -1.390***(0.355)     -1.128***(0.360)     -0.387   (0.858) 
PSHDIV        -0.931***(0.109)     -0.681***(0.233)     -1.559***(0.310)      2.673***(0.502) 
PSHUNMARR     -0.589***(0.078)     -0.539***(0.184)     -0.460** (0.193)      0.483   (0.351) 
PHCHO18        0.347***(0.049)      0.724***(0.160)      0.262   (0.175)      0.292   (0.426) 
PSHWCHU18     -0.021   (0.493)     -2.266   (1.857)     -2.126   (1.761)      0.744   (3.979) 
PSHEDU         0.001   (0.107)      0.186   (0.156)     -0.217   (0.169)      0.381   (0.329) 
PSHEARLYR     -0.085   (0.070)     -0.189   (0.136)     -0.393** (0.157)      0.519** (0.241) 
PSHSOCBEN      0.007   (0.033)      0.055   (0.101)      0.039   (0.107)     -0.238   (0.178) 
PSHUNEMP      -0.334***(0.072)     -0.923***(0.265)     -1.320***(0.339)      1.009*  (0.532) 
PSH3C         -0.013** (0.006)     -0.013   (0.016)     -0.023   (0.016)      0.004   (0.031) 
PSHSUBHOU     -0.654***(0.023)     -0.566***(0.037)     -0.405***(0.041)      0.183   (0.182) 
PSHHSUB        0.099** (0.050)     -0.185*  (0.109)     -0.554***(0.113)      0.547** (0.218) 
PSHRSUB       -0.461***(0.057)     -0.680***(0.150)     -0.688***(0.153)      0.515   (0.339) 
POPDEN        -6.571***(2.363)     -5.914*  (3.685)      3.887   (5.453)      2.010   (10.21) 
PROPTAX       -0.119** (0.055)      0.000   (0.122)     -0.132   (0.127)      0.332   (0.223) 
TAXRATE        0.113*  (0.060)      0.211   (0.147)      0.272*  (0.154)     -0.982***(0.302) 
TAXBASE       -0.851***(0.168)     -1.853***(0.473)     -0.966*  (0.559)     -0.935   (0.971) 
REGUL         -2.049***(0.417)     -1.319***(0.485)     -1.263***(0.492)      1.113   (1.116) 
PSHEDU^2      -0.002   (0.003)     -0.006   (0.004)      0.002   (0.004)     -0.006   (0.009) 
PROPTAX^2      0.004***(0.002)      0.003   (0.004)      0.006   (0.004)     -0.013*  (0.007) 
PSHUNEMP^2     0.022***(0.004)      0.054***(0.013)      0.075***(0.017)     -0.053*  (0.027) 
TAXBASE^2      0.022***(0.005)      0.044***(0.013)      0.010   (0.016)      0.034   (0.028) 
PSH3C*T       -0.029***(0.006)      0.001   (0.011)     -0.007   (0.012)     -0.005   (0.016) 
PSHSUBHOU*T    0.020***(0.002)      0.020***(0.004)      0.004   (0.004)      0.014   (0.010) 
PSHHSUB*T     -0.044***(0.005)     -0.035***(0.012)      0.015   (0.014)     -0.064** (0.026) 
PSHRSUB*T     -0.057***(0.013)     -0.060   (0.075)      0.008   (0.075)     -0.042   (0.109) 
REGUL*T        0.202***(0.004)      0.197***(0.058)      0.122** (0.060)     -0.095   (0.126) 
LAMBDA(1994)                        0.062** (0.031)      0.712** (0.291) 
LAMBDA(1995)                        0.066** (0.030)      0.722** (0.289) 
LAMBDA(1996)                        0.058** (0.029)      0.733** (0.290) 
LAMBDA(1997)                        0.059** (0.029)      0.744***(0.289) 
LAMBDA(1998)                        0.073** (0.029)      0.760***(0.284) 
LAMBDA(1999)                        0.013   (0.030)      0.752** (0.302) 
LAMBDA(2000)                        0.024   (0.030)      0.769***(0.296) 
LAMBDA(2001)                        0.022   (0.030)      0.781***(0.296) 
LAMBDA(2002)                        0.026   (0.031)      0.795***(0.295) 
LAMBDA(2003)                        0.039   (0.032)      0.809***(0.292) 
LAMBDA(2004)                        0.037   (0.033)      0.812***(0.292) 
 
LogL          -1941.28             -1939.81                        -2227.59 
AIC            4080.56              4101.64                         4743.19 
LM for SAC      420.42***(df=11) 
Wald for equal gamma’s               417.65***(df=10)                11.26   (df=10) 
Wald for DL in SAR-XDL-SUR                                          119.02***(df=32) 
Wald tests for Durbin restrictions in SAR-XDL-SUR (df=32): 
1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004 
66.99*** 66.87*** 66.30*** 65.96*** 65.93*** 64.32*** 64.16*** 63.71*** 63.32*** 63.16*** 63.05*** 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Significanse indicated by *** (1%), **(5%), *(10%) 